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Abstrat
This paper investigates the impat of maroeonomi and monetary news on U.S.
Government bond rate level and volatility. Speially, it heks if these news aet
dierently interest rate level and volatility during "stable" and "unstable" periods. "Un-
stable" periods orrespond to the periods marked by a great unertainty on Government
bond market. To do this, rst we distinguish the "stable" and "unstable" periods by
estimating interest rate dynamis with a markov swithing ARCH proess, proposed
by Hamilton and Susmel (1994). The results of this rst estimation suggest that U.S.
interest rate volatility is higher during periods of nanial rises, war time periods and
during periods marked by eonomi or poliy instability. We use these results to eval-
∗
BETA-THEME, Université Louis Pasteur, Department of Eonomis, tuysuzournot.u-strasbg.fr
1
uate interest rate mean and volatility response to U.S. maroeonomi and monetary
news with an EGARCH model, proposed by Nelson (1991). The results show that news
announements do not have important impat on interest rate volatility during "stable"
periods. In ontrast, they strongly aet market volatility during "unstable" periods.
Finally, we hek whether positive and negative news announements inuene dier-
ently bond rate volatility during "unstable" periods. The results suggest that negative
news have important eets on the bond market volatility ompared to the eets of
positive news.
JEL Classiation: E4; E5; G1
keywords: News announements, Government bond rate, EGARCH, ARCH Markov
Swithing, Eonomi instability, Monetary poliy instability, Finanial risis.
1 Introdution
Interest rate volatility has beome an inreasing onern to poliymakers and nanial mar-
ket partiipants alike. Inreased market volatility is assoiated with higher unertainty about
market outlooks, whih also aets, among other things, the ability of market partiipants to
disern the monetary poliy stane. Long term interest rate volatility aets also the invest-
ment deisions and thus overall eonomi ativity. In addition, nanial market volatility
plays an important role in understanding how nanial instruments are pried.
Several authors have foused on the role of maroeonomi news as a soure of nanial
market volatility and partiularly Government bond market (Fleming and Remolona, 1997,
1999; Jones et al., 1998; Li and Engle, 1998; Bollerslev, Cai and Song, 2000; Balduzzi, Elton
and Green, 2001; Lee, 2002). For example, Ederington and Lee (1993), Beker, Finnerty and
Kopeky (1996) and Balduzzi, Elton and Green (1996) doument the importane of maroe-
onomi announements as a major soure of Bond market volatility. Most of the existing
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literature try to nd out whih maroeonomi releases have a signiant impat on pries
and volatility in nanial markets (Jones et al., 1998; Li and Engle, 1998; Christiansen, 2000;
Goeij and Marquering, 2006). All these researhers suppose onstant the nanial market re-
sponse to maroeonomi and monetary news. In ontrast with the lassial approah, some
authors onsider that the reation of interest rate levels and volatility to maroeonomi and
monetary news is unstable. A large part of these authors suppose that "good" and "bad"
news have not the same impat on nanial market volatility (Morgan, 1993; Thoma, 1994;
Karras, 1996; Li and Engle, 1998; Christiansen, 2000; Kim et al., 2004). As for Chadha
and Nolan (2001), Clare and Courtenay (2001a,b), Lee (2002) and Tuysuz (2007a, b, ),
they suppose that market interest rate reation to news depends strongly to entral bank
transpareny and redibility degrees. Moreover, some papers show that during periods of
high unertainty about eonomi situation, markets operators an reat strongly to maroe-
onomi news (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhandani et al., 1992; MQueen and Roley, 1993; Fleming
and Remolona, 1997; Veronesi, 1999).
The previous empirial work onsiders either only the unertainty related to monetary
poliy or to eonomi situation. In ontrast to the existing literature this paper takes into
aount both soures of unertainty whih generate unertainty on nanial market. In ad-
dition, it onsiders other soures of market unertainty, suh as nanial rises. Speially,
in ontrast with the existing papers, this paper investigates whether the eets of maroe-
onomi and monetary news on interest rate level and volatility are dierent during "stable"
and "unstable" periods. "unstable" periods orrespond to the periods marked by a great
unertainty on Government bond market. These "unstable" periods orrespond not only to
periods marked by eonomi and monetary instability but also to periods marked by nanial
instability. For the present analysis, four daily U.S. Government bond interest rate series
(3, 5, 7 and 10 year rate) and several maroeonomi news are used. Maroeonomi news
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inlude FED target variables and the oial interest rate deisions about U.S. monetary
poliy. Interest rate dynamis are, rst, evaluated with a markov-swithing ARCH model,
proposed by Hamilton and Susmel (1994), in order to determine "stable" and "unstable"
periods. Using the results obtained in this rst stage, interest rate dynamis are evaluated
with an EGARCH model, proposed by Nelson (1991). This model enables to take into a-
ount the onditional heterosedastiity eet, asymmetri eets and have the advantage
of not having to impose positively restritions on the oeients in the onditional volatility
equation. Moreover, we test whether nanial operators reat dierently to positive ("good")
and negative ("bad") maroeonomi news. Speially, we test whether "good" and "badd"
news aet dierently market volatility.
The paper proeeds as follows. Setion 2 presents the fators that inuene the reation
of interest rate level and volatility to maroeonomi and monetary news. Setion 3 gives
information on the data used for the analysis. After presenting in detail the ARCH markov-
swithing model, setion 4 disusses the results obtained. Setion 5 uses the results of setion
4 to evaluate interest rate level and volatility response to maroeonomi and monetary news
using an EGARCH model. Setion 6 analyzes the results, and nally, setion 7 onludes.
2 Heterogeneity of interest rate response to eonomi
news
The literature on herd behavior and informational asades (Banerjee 1992, Bikhandani
and al. 1992) emphasises that what drives nanial market outomes is not so muh the
ourrene of news per se, but how this new information is proessed and interpreted by
market partiipants. The same news an have a vastly dierent eet on markets depending
on the onditions of markets and market partiipants. Market unertainty an be implied
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by monetary poliy unertainty, eonomi unertainty and/or nanial unertainty.
2.1 The importane of the entral bank transpareny and redibil-
ity
A widely researhed area is the eet of announements, and in partiular of news on entral
bank target variables and of monetary poliy rate hanges, on the yield urve. Several
authors argue that the impat of news related to entral bank target variables on interest
rate depends strongly on the redibility and transpareny of entral bank (Haldane and
Read, 1999, 2000; Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001; Chadha and Nolan, 2001; Gravelle and
Moessner, 2001; Parent, 2003; Connolly and Kohler, 2004; Tuysuz, 2007 b,). If a entral
bank is fully transparent and redible, news on entral bank target variables should alone
sue to antiipate future hanges in monetary rate. In this situation, market interest rate
level should only reat to entral bank target variables news. As market operators an
auratly antiipate entral bank rate deisions, the diusion of these deisions onveys any
information to market partiipants. Thus, the diusion of these deisions should not inuene
interest rate level and volatility. In ontrast, if a entral bank is not fully transparent and
redible then announements on entral bank target variables inuene interest rate level
and volatility. In addition, in the last situation market operators annot antiipate orretly
entral bank rate hanges deisions. Thus, the unexpeted part of entral bank rate hanges
inuenes interest rate level and volatility. In sum, the reation of interest rate level and
volatility to maroeonomi and monetary news and to unexpeted entral bank rate hanges
strongly depends on the transpareny and redibility of entral bank. Consequently a greater
transpareny and/or redibility should aet interest rate response to entral bank target
variables news and to unexpeted hanges in poliy rate (Sellon and Weiner, 1996; Muller and
Zelmer, 1999; Haldane and Read, 2000; Clare and Courtenay, 2001; Gravelle and Moessner,
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2001; Urih and Wahtel, 2001; Kuttner, 2001; Parent, 2003, Coppel and Connolly, 2003,
Tuysuz, 2007b,).
Furthermore, Demiralp and Jorda (2002) and Tuysuz (2007a) argue that unertainty re-
lated to monetary poliy is more greater around the turning point of monetary poliy stane.
For example, aording to Demiralp and Jorda (2002), when market partiipant have no idea
about the nature on the monetary poliy stane around the turning point, announements
tend to have the largest eet on money markets. The authors provide evidene that market
response to monetary poliy deisions is markedly stronger when these deisions introdue
a diretional hange in monetary poliy. Tuysuz (2007a) onrms a similar result on the
volatility of interest rate for US, UK, Germain and Frenh data. Preisely, the author shows
that interest rate volatility is greater during periods marked by high unertainty about the
future deisions of the entral bank. These periods often orrespond to the period when
entral bank hange the diretion of his monetary poliy.
2.2 The role of the eonomi situation
Market response to maroeonomi news releases strongly depends upon the momentum of
the business yle (MQueen and Roley, 1993; Garia and Shaller, 1995; Weise, Fleming and
Remolona,1997; 1999; Veronesi, 1999; Balduzzi et al., 2001; Andersen et al., 2004; Veredas,
2005). For instane, by ontrolling the eonomi yle
1
, Fleming and Remolona nd that
durable goods orders, GDP, housing starts and unemployment announements had a more
signiant impat upon Government bond pries and trading volumes one the eonomi
yle had been aounted for. In a similar vein, Veredas nd that bad news do not have
the same impat on the bonds pries during expansion and reession periods. Contrary
1
Fleming and Remolona (1997) ontrolled for the eonomi yle by using either a measure of implied
volatility, or the expeted hange in the FED funds rate as a proxy for market onditions.
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to the previous results, Andersen et al. 2004 nd that the state of the eonomy does not
inuene the reation bond and exhange markets to real-time U.S. maroeonomi news.
However, the authors nd that equity markets reat dierently to the same maroeonomi
news depending on the state of the eonomy, with bad news having a positive impat during
expansions and having negative impat during reessions. Similarly, MQueen and Roley
nd that by lassifying eonomi ativity as being either "high", "medium" or "low" relative
to trend, it was easier to identify reations to the U.S. stok market to US maroeonomi
announements. Finally, Veronesi show theoretially that when investors assign high proba-
bility to the good state of eonomy then the prie redution due to bad news is greater that
the redution in expeted future dividends. Similarly, when investors assign high probability
to the bad state of eonomy then the inrease in the prie, implied by a good news, is lower
that the inrease in expeted future dividends.
On the volatility level, Chadha and Nolan (2001) show that English interest rate volatility
seems to be lowest during the late 1980s boom in U.K. eonomy. In other world, the authors
suggest that interest rate volatility is higher during reession. This oinidene suggests that
higher volatility an be explained by unertainty about eonomi situation. In the same way,
Tuysuz (2007a) shows that interest rates are more volatile around business yle turning
points. More generally, investors tend to be more unertain about the future growth rate of
the eonomy during reessions
2
thereby these behaviors an partly justify higher volatility
of nanial market. Contrary to nanial seurities pries levels, few authors analyze the
eets of news on market volatility by distinguishing eonomy state.
2
Authors as Veronesi (1999) shows that eonomists' foreasts about future real output are more dispersed
when the eonomy is ontrating.
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2.3 The role of nanial rises
In the literature, generally authors analyze diretly the dynami of seurities without on-
sidering maroeonomi and monetary news (Edwards, 1998, 2000; Park and Song, 1999;
Edwards and Susmel, 2000; Bekaert et al., 2002; Baur, 2003; Alper and Yilmaz, 2004;
Fernandez-Izquierdo and Lafuente, 2004; Hon et al., 2005; Tuysuz, 2007a). All the authors
nd that during nanial rises periods nanial operators unertainty are very higher and
markets volatility are also very important. A large part of this volatility an be explained
by unertainty about nanial market evolution and then by nanial transation. By in-
uening nanial markets, nanial rises aet also domesti and foreign eonomi and
monetary situation. The eets on eonomi ativity rests mainly on the eets of nanial
rises on exhange market and then on trade. In addition, variations of Government bonds
pries (rates) inuene investment hoie and thereby eonomi ativity. Having onsiene
of these eets, the market operators revise their expetations about future evolution of the
eonomi ativity and about the future ondut of monetary poliy. However, during periods
of nanial rises these revisions an be very heterogeneous and partiularly if entral bank is
not fully transparent and/or redible. Thus, during nanial rises the great unertainty on
nanial market and the sudden and important revisions of agents' expetations an aet
the inuene of maroeonomi and monetary news on seurity dynamis. This hange of
the eets depends on the eonomi situation before the risis and on the transpareny and
redibility of entral bank.
3 Data Desription and Preliminary Tests
This setion presents the dataset and its statistial properties. The empirial part uses data
series on interest rates, maroeonomi announements and unexpeted variations of key
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interest rates.
3.1 Interest rate series
Government bond rate orresponding to maturities of respetively 3, 5, 7 and 10 years are
onsidered in this study. These series over the period ranging from the rst of July 1990
to July, 30th, 2004. This data orresponds to the quotes at loal time market losure: 17:30
Eastern Standard Time (EST).
In order to determine the order of integration of these series we arry out a series of
unit-root tests. Three dierent kinds of unit-root tests are performed: the standard ADF
test, the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test and nally the Seo (1999) test. Aording to the
results of the ADF test, displayed in table 7, we annot rejet the null hypothesis of unit root
for any of the four series. These results are onrmed for the Zivot and Andrews test as well
as the Seo test. The Seo statisti allows to aount for strutural hanges in the series while
the former aounts for the presene of onditional heteroskedastiity. Indeed, using Box-
Piere, Ljung-Box and LM statistis (see Table 8), the null hypothesis of homoskedastiity
is rejeted at the 5% level for all assets onsidered in our study. Thus, all interest rate series
present a unit root and interest rates dierentials will be used in the empirial analysis.
These interest rate series are also onditionally heterosedasti.
3.2 Announements and surprises
Aording to Balduzzi et al. (1997), it is not the announement per se that is important,
but rather the information it onveys to the market partiipants. Indeed, if announements
only omfort agents in their expetations they will not indue any behavioral hanges. Sine
the aim of this paper is to study the eet of announements on the dynamis of interest
rates, series that reet unantiipated variations for the relevant series are needed. These
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"surprises" are dened as the dierene between the observed values for the variables and
the values that were antiipated. As antiipations annot be observed diretly some approx-
imation are needed. A solution suggests by Balduzzi et al. (1999) is to hoose the surveys
published by Money Market Servie (MMS) for US maroeonomi announements. This
organization ollets every Friday foreasts from a panel of market partiipants for the fol-
lowing week announements. Median values for eah variable were omputed. Those values
were retained as proxies of market partiipant expetations.
In more detail, these variables orrespond to possible targets for entral banks. That is,
primarily, news onerning the ination rate and the global health of the eonomies onsid-
ered. The onsidered announements onern unemployment (UE), onsumer prie index
(CPI), prodution prie index (PPI), gross domesti produt (GDP), balane of payment
(BP) and retail sales (RET). These variables are announed around 9:00 a.m. .
Two methods have been used in the literature for the omputation of the unexpeted part
of monetary poliy deisions. The rst method uses surveys for maroeonomi announe-
ments as previously disussed. The alternative approximates entral bank deisions through
arefully hosen asset quotations. More preisely, the methodology proposed by Kuttner
(2001) suggests that FED future fund pries onstitute a suitable proxy for FED expeted
ations. This latter solution is preferable to the surveys sine, as pointed by Ehrmann and
Fratzher (2003), (2005a), the weekly frequeny of surveys prevents from taking into a-
ount most reent expetations. On the other hand, asset pries used in this study are
those from the day preeding entral bank deisions. Pries of future ontrats on FED
funds are a reasonable hoie as they meet the requirements put forward by Brooke et al.
(2000), namely (i) its maturity is lose to that of the key interest rate, (ii) it is a liquid
asset and (iii) its maturity is shorter than the time interval between Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) meetings. Moreover, as shown by Krueger and Kuttner (1996), future
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pries provide an eient measure for the FED fund rate foreasts. Indeed, foreast errors
are unorrelated with the other variables observed at the ontrat's priing time. Following
Kuttner's methodology, we extrat the unexpeted part of monetary authorities' deisions,
onsidering that this unexpeted omponent is reeted by the dierene between the future
pries on the announement day and the day before. More preisely, the relationship between
the foreast error (∆r∗,nat ) and the future ontrat rates an be written as follows:
∆r∗,nat =
T
T − τ (ft − ft−1), (1)
where f denotes interest rate on the future ontrat, T is the number of days in the month
under onsideration and τ is the day of the month.
4 Evaluation of the "stable" and "unstable" periods
One of the most interesting aspets of Government bond rate variation is that those variations
hanges widely aross time. More preisely, gures 5 through 8, in appendix, show that
during some periods interest rate variations are very high and low during another periods. In
addition, these interest rate variations tend to be persistent giving rise to the well doumented
volatility lustering and "GARCH-type" behavior of return
3
. In order to take into aount
the heterosedastiity eet and the hange of interest rate volatility dynami, interest rate
dynamis are evaluated with a markov-swithing ARCH model proposed by Hamilton and
Susmel (1994). This model enables to determine the periods of "high" (resp. "slow")
interest rate volatility and then periods marked by great unertainty on bond market. After
presenting the markov-swithing ARCH model, we will present and disuss the results and
then determine the soures of unertainty whih generate unertainty on Government bond
market.
3
See Bollerslev et al. (1992) for an exellent survey of the literature.
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4.1 Markov-Swithing model
Hamilton and Susmel (1994) modify the ARCH proesses proposed by Engle (1982) to a-
ount for several strutural hanges in data and propose a Swithing ARCH (SWARCH)
model. The AR-SWARCH model an be written as follows:
∆rt = a+ b∆rt−1 + ǫt, (2)
ǫt =
√
gst .ut,
ut =
√
ht.vt,
ht = w +
J∑
j=1
αju
2
t−j j = 1, 2, ..., J st = 1, 2, ...,K.
Where ∆rt represents the rst-dierened interest rate. The innovations ǫt are omposed
by two elements, whih are gst and ut. ut is also omposed by two omponents: ht and vt.
The onditional volatility, ht, is supposed drive by a ARCH model with j order. The inno-
vations vt follow a Gaussian or Student t distribution. As for gst , they are sale parameters
that apture the hange in regime. One of the g's is unidentied and, hene, g1 is set equal
to 1. Thus, gs2 is supposed gs2 > gs1 . st denotes an unobserved random variable that an
values 1,2,...,k and is assumed to be governed by a rst order Markov hain with transition
probability, pi,j . For example, k = 2, pi,j , the transition probability from state i, at time
t− 1 to state j at time t is dened as:
p(st = 1|st−1 = 1) = p11,
p(st = 2|st−1 = 1) = p12,
p(st = 1|st−1 = 2) = p21,
p(st = 2|st−1 = 2) = p22,
12
with p11 + p12 = p21 + p22 = 1.
Under this speiation, the transition probabilities, the pij 's, are onstant. For example,
if interest rate was in a high volatility state last period (st−1 = 2), the probability of hanging
to the low volatility state (st = 1) is a xed onstant p21.
As a byprodut of the Maximum likelihood estimation, it is possible to make inferenes
about partiular state of the seurity at any date. For this the "lter probabilities" or
the "smooth probabilities" an be used. The "lter probabilities", p(st, st−1|rt, rt−1, ..., r1,
denote the onditional probability that the state at date t is st and that at date t − 1 was
st−1. These probabilities are onditional on the values of the observed interest rate through
date t. As for "smooth probabilities", p(st|rT , rT−1, ..., r1, are inferenes about the state at
date t based on data available through some future date T (end of sample).
Given the unit-root test in setion 2, rst-dierened interest rate dynamis are evaluated
with the model desribed in equation 2. The evaluated "smooth probabilities" that the
volatility is in the seond state (high volatility state) are illustrated by the gures 1 through
4. A summary of our ndings on the extent and the duration of "high" interest rate volatility
during the period onsidered is given in the table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here℄
[Insert Figure 1 here℄
[Insert Figure 2 here℄
[Insert Figure 3 here℄
[Insert Figure 4 here℄
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4.2 Empirial results
The omparison of the periods of "high" volatility (see table 1) with the monetary and
nanial situation as well as the eonomi and politial environment, we notie that these
periods of "high" volatility oinide with the periods marked by unertainty on the eonomi
and/or monetary and/or nanial instability.
The 1990s was marked by several nanial rises suh as the SME risis (September 1992
and August 1993), the U.S. Government bond market risis (January 1994), the Mexian
risis (Deember 1994), the Asian risis (July 1997), the Russian risis (August 1998), the
Bresilian risis (February 1999), the Argentine risis (November 2001) and the bursting of the
tehnology and internet bubble in 2002 in USA. Figures 1 through 4 and table 1 show that
interest rate volatility was in the "high" state during periods orresponding to those periods
overing the rst SME risis, the U.S. Government bond market risis, the Russian risis,
the Argentina risis and the bursting of the tehnology and internet bubble in 2002. These
oinidenes suggest that the inrease in interest rate volatility during these periods an be
explained by unertainty implied by these rises. In addition, aording to these results there
was a fairly rapid transmission of respetively British, Mexian, Asian, Russian, Bresilian
and Argentine nanial instability to U.S. nanial market.
As gures 1 thought 4 show U.S. interest rate volatility shifts to the "high" state in late
September 2001. This date orresponds to the attak in USA on September 11th 2001. This
event arose unertainty on nanial markets in various ountries and in partiular on U.S.
markets. Figures 1 through 4 and table 1 suggest that U.S. interest rate volatility were on
"high" state also during the Gulf War whih began on August 2, 1990. The invasion of Kuwait
by the Iraquian army provoked important reation of all UN members and in partiular
USA. This reation and the inrease of oil pries have ontributed to the unertainty in the
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nanial market whih, in turn, inrease the volatility. The unertainty has fallen remarkably
beginning from September 1990. This date oinides with the date when U.S. interest rate
volatility shifts to "low" state (see gures 1 through 4 and table 1). This oinidene suggests
that the high interest rate volatility observed between August and September 1990 an be
explained by the unertainty implied by the Gulf war and the inrease of the oil prie. The
stability on the oil market and the relatively peaeful period lasted only until January 1991.
The international intervention in January 1991 lead to the withdrawal of Iraqi fores from
Kuwait whih resulted in an important inrease in oil pries during this period. These events
generated unertainty on the nanial market. Our results suggest that this unertainty was
less important than the unertainty observed during the August and September 1990. Indeed,
only the 10 year interest rate volatility was on "high" state during January 1991.
In addition, during periods marked by eonomi and monetary poliy unertainty U.S
interest rate volatility in all series was on the "high" state (see gures 1 through 4 and
table 1). These periods over the rst quarter of 1992, the period from February to Mars
1993, the seond and third quarter of 1995, the period between February and August 1996,
rst half of 1999 as well as the rst and seond quarter of 2000. All of these periods are
marked with unertainty about the future deisions of the entral bank. For instane, during
the rst and the seond quarter of 1995, eonomi and nanial agents estimated that U.S.
eonomy was going through a reession. Hene, they antiipated a hange of the FED
poliy. Contrary to the expetations, FED did not hange its rate during this period whih,
in turn, indued unertainty on the nanial market, partiularly in the seond quarter of
1995. The FED deided to derease its rate only in July 1995. This deision eliminated
the unertainty about the monetary poliy. In ontrast with the previous situation, in 1996
the unertainty was about the ination rate and the FED deisions. More preisely, during
the rst quarter of 1996, the observed U.S. eonomi growth was greater than the expeted
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level, whih raised worries about the future ination rate. Put dierently, eonomi and
nanial agents antiipated an ination risk hene a hange in the Fed's monetary poliy
orientation. However, from January to summer 1996, FED did not hange its rate. The fat
that the expetations of an inrease in FED's rate is not fullled lead to higher unertainty
on nanial market. This situation persisted until summer 1996, the period during whih
the Governor of the FED armed his onvition about the absene of eonomi overheating
in the United States. In addition, Alan Greenspan delared that the evolution of pries in
USA was perfetly ontrolled and that in ase of an ination risk the FOMC would intervene
quikly. These remarks helped redue unertainty about U.S. ination and monetary poliy
deisions. In sum, inationary risk and the unertainty about the FED's future deision are
the main fators whih an explain the rise of U.S. interest rate volatility, observed in gures
1 through 4, between February to September 1996.
Finally, interest rate was relatively high during periods marked not only by unertainty
about the eonomi, monetary and nanial situation but also by instability on the ex-
hange rate market. For instane, during the rst half of 2001 the dollar appreiated too
muh against the euro and the yen. This event aeted negatively the U.S. eonomi om-
petitiveness. In addition, the strong variations of the exhange rates inuened diretly the
portfolio returns and hene reated unertainty on nanial markets. The instability on
exhange rate market fell strongly on April 2001. This fall redued the risk related to the
U.S. eonomy and the unertainty on nanial markets. In sum, the strong appreiation
of the dollar against the main urrenies and the greater instability on the exhange rate
market an explain unertainty on nanial market and the greater volatility of the interest
rate during the rst half of 2001, observed in the gures 1 through 4.
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5 Evaluating interest rate response to news during "sta-
ble" and "unstable" periods.
In this setion, we will hek whether interest rate level and volatility respond dierently
to maroeonomi and monetary news during "stable" and "unstable" periods. For this, an
AR-EGARCH model, proposed by Nelson (1991), is used.
5.1 Model
Given the unit-root test in setion 2, the rst-dierened interest rate response to maroe-
onomi and monetary news is modeled as follows:
∆Rt = a+ b∆Rt−1 + c∆r
∗
t +
K∑
k=1
dkD
a
k,t
+ c1∆r
∗
t ∗DumR +
K∑
k=1
dk,1D
a
k,t ∗DumR + ǫt, (3)
where Rt denotes interest rate dierentials in period t. ∆r
∗
τ and D
a
k,t, k = 1, . . . ,K, orre-
spond respetively to the unexpeted part of the monetary poliy rate hanges and a set of
maroeonomi news. c and dk measure the eets of those news on interest rate level during
"stable" periods. During "unstable" periods, these eets are measured by c1 and dk,1. The
dummy variable (DumR) take the value 1 during "unstable" periods and 0 otherwise. As
maroeonomi news are announed around 9:00 a.m. and monetary poliy rate deisions
are diused around 2:30 p.m., Government bond rates in period t respond to maroeonomi
news and monetary poliy deisions immediately on the day of announements (period t).
The term ǫt orresponds to the innovation series. Several authors estimate equation (3)
supposing that the innovations are a Gaussian white noise (Balduzzi et al., 1999; Bern-
hardsen, 2000; Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001; Favero, 2001; Kearney, 2001; Caporale and
Williams, 2002; Parent, 2003). In the same line, equation (3) was estimated, rst by suppos-
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ing that the innovations are a Gaussian white noise and Engle Arh LM statistis was then
applied to hek whether the innovations ǫt are onditionally homosedasti. Table 9, in the
Appendix, enables to rejet the null hypothesis and then aept the hypothesis that the in-
terest rates volatility is onditionally heterosedasti. Sine Bollerslev proposed the GARCH
models in 1986, numerous authors used suh model to take into aount the persistene in
onditional varianes of nanial market. In a GARCH model, an unantiipated drop and
an unantiipated rise in the same magnitude in an interest rate are assumed to generate
the same impat on its future volatility. However, authors like Kim and Sheen (2000), Lee
(2002) and Ehrmann and Fratzsher (2002, 2003, 2005)), argue that the size and the sign
of the shoks inuene dierently the future nanial market volatility. On the other hand,
DeGoij and Marquering (2006) nd that asymmetri volatility in the Treasury bond market
an largely be explained by maroeonomi announement news. This suggests that the
asymmetri volatility nd in government bond markets is likely due to misspeiation of
the volatility model. Indeed, after having inluded maroeonomi announements into their
model, they notie that the asymmetry disappears. In order to take into aount the ondi-
tional heterosedastiy eet and to hek the asymmetri eet, the exponential GARCH
(EGARCH) approah of Nelson (1991) was applied to estimate the eet of maroeonomi
and monetary news on the onditional varianes of the interest rates. One of the advantages
of the EGARCH model is the non imposition of positively restritions on the oeients in
the onditional variane equation. This model an be expressed as:
ln(ht) = w + α
ǫt−1√
ht−1
+ βln(ht−1) + θ(| ǫt−1√
ht−1
| −
√
2/π)
+ γDumr∗τ +
K∑
k=1
ϕkDum
a
k,t
+ γ1Dumr∗τ ∗DumR +
K∑
k=1
ϕk,1Dum
a
k,t ∗DumR. (4)
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The term α reets dierent impats of positive and negative innovations on onditional
varianes. A positive (resp. negative) α estimate implies that a positive innovation inreases
volatility more (resp. less) than a negative (resp. positive) innovation of an equal magnitude.
The term θ determines the size eet. As in the mean equation (3), we take into aount the
inuene of maroeonomi and poliy variables. Contrary to the level equation, dummies
are used instead of atual news in order to avoid multiollinearity with the onditional mean
regressors.
Assuming that c1 = dk,1 = γ1 = ϕk,1 = 0, k = K gives the lassial benhmark model.
In this lassial model, interest rate level and volatility response to maroeonomi and
monetary news is onstant over the whole sample retained in the paper. In order to hek
if this response is dierent between "stable" and "unstable" periods interest rate dynamis
are evaluated with the model desribed by the equations 3 and 4.
5.2 Empirial results
Aording to table 3, U.S. interest rates are mainly sensitive to the onsumer prie index
(CPI) news and to the unexpeted part of the FED deisions (dCPI and c). These news
have a positive impat on Government bonds rates. This is in aordane with theoretial
expetanies. Indeed, the onsumer prie index an serve as a proxy for the ination level.
Thus, a positive surprise orresponds to an underestimation of the ination level and market
investors will revise their expetations about FED's monetary poliy. As for FED deisions,
our results show that an inrease in unexpeted entral bank rate hanges evokes an im-
mediate inrease in market interest rates and vie versa. This positive eet has already
been shown by empirial studies suh as Cook and Hahn (1989), Kuttner (2001), Kim and
Sheen (2000) or Lee (2002). Cook and Hahn are the rst to establish a positive empirial
relationship between entral bank rates and long term rates. They argue that their results
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support the expetations theory of the term struture
4
.
Conerning the asymmetri response of interest rate, interest rates volatility respond
dierently to news during "stable" and "unstable" periods. Speially, table 4 shows that
during "normal" ("stable") periods maroeonomi and monetary news announements have
nearly no inuene on interest rates volatility. Note that only the balane of payment
announement days inuene Government bond rate volatility (γbp). On the ontrary, during
"unstable" periods the eets of these news announements on volatility is quite important.
Indeed, during "unstable" periods bond rate volatility augment the day FED deisions,
unemployment rate, gross domesti produt and balane of payment news are announed
(γr∗,1, γUE,1, γbp,1 and γgdp,1). In ontrast, regarding the level, the results show that interest
rate level response to maroeonomi and monetary news does not dier signiantly aross
"stable" and "unstable" periods.
[Insert Table 2 here℄
[Insert Table 3 here℄
[Insert Table 4 here℄
The fat that news announements have little impat on interest rate volatility during
the stable" periods an be explained mainly by two fators. First, when entral bank is fully
transparent and redible maroeonomi and monetary news announements do not gen-
erate unertainty on nanial market and hene do not inuene interest rate volatility, as
pointed out by Chadha and Nolan (2001), Clare and Courtenay (2001a,b) and Tuysuz (2006,
2007a,b,). Following their approah, our results suggest that FED is fully transparent and
4
The expetations theory says that a long term interest rate should be equal to the average of the short
term interest rates over the same period of time plus a term premium; thus, an inrease in the rst ouple
of short rate should drive up the long rate in a lesser extent.
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redible. Atually, FED was onsidered as opaque prior to 1994. However, the transpareny
degree of FED inreases sine 1994. Indeed, beginning this date the U.S. Federal Reserve has
started to publily announe FOMC poliy hanges. In a similar vein, after 1999, press state-
ments announing poliy deisions oer greater detail on all poliy deisions, and our after
every meeting. In addition, sine May 1999 the poliy bias has been announed immediately
after eah FOMC meeting making it an eetive forward-looking signal. In February 2000,
Fed moved away from the poliy bias terminology and instead inserted a formulai "bal-
ane of risks" sentene in order to larify its asymmetri diretives regarding inationary
pressures and eonomi weaknesses. Finally, in Marh 2002, the FOMC started to publish
a roll all of the votes on the Federal Funds target, inluding the preferred poliy hoie
of any dissenters. Even all these transpareny measures do not indue full transpareny of
FED. Indeed, Diner and Eihengreen (2007) nd that in 2005 FED transpareny degree
was about 61%.
The seond explanation rests on the speed of assimilation of the news by nanial mar-
ket and then by interest rate dynami. Several authors nd a signiant inrease in bond
volatility as soon as the news are released (Ederington and Lee, 1993; Crain and Lee, 1995;
Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997; Fleming and Remolona, 1997; Jones et al., 1998). However,
this inrease does not persist, as the news are immediately inorporated in the pries. For in-
stane, DeGoeij and Marquering (2006) nd that bond market inorporates the impliations
of maroeonomi announement news faster than any other information. As for Fleming
and Remolona (1997), they nd that U.S. Government bond rate volatility rise sharply as
soon as U.S. maroeonomi news are released and remain relatively at for the rest of the
day. Preisely, these authors notie that U.S. interest rate volatility rise around 8.30 (time
when ertain U.S. maroeonomi news are released) and remain at afterward. The results
obtained by Ederington and Lee and Fleming and Remolona indiate that most of bond
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pries respond within one or 2 minutes to major maroeonomi announements.
The third observation onerns interest rate volatility. Table 4 shows that both mag-
nitude (or size) and sign eets of the onditional (or standardized) shoks on onditional
variane are signiant. Namely, the size eets on intermediate-term interest rate volatility
are signiant (θ). As for the sign eets, our results suggest that medium and long term
interest rate volatility reat dierently to positive and negative standardized shoks (α). The
eet of the absolute value of the standardized shoks on interest rate volatility is positive.
In ontrast, interest rate volatility reat positively (negatively) to negative (positive) stan-
dardized shoks. The sign of these size and sign eets on interest rate volatility is in line
with theoretial expetanies where as they ontradit the results of De Goeij and Marquer-
ing (2006). These authors note that asymmetri volatility in the Treasury bond market an
be largely explained by maroeonomi announement shoks.
Finally, results obtained from the benhmark model (see table 2) to the model desribed
in equations 3 and 4 (see tables 3 and 4) are ompared. Aording to table 2, interest rate
volatility is inuened by the announements of unemployment, onsumer prie index, gross
domesti produt and retail sales as well as FED deisions news (γr∗ , γUE , γCPI , γGDP and
γRET ). However, when we distinguish between "stable" and "unstable" periods, it an be
seen that these news announement days have an impat on bond market volatility only
during "unstable" periods (see table 4).
6 Do positive and negative news aet interest rate dif-
ferently?
Several authors nd that positive and negative news do not have the same impat on the -
nanial market (Morgan, 1993; Thoma, 1994; Karras, 1996; Li and Engle, 1998; Christiansen,
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2000; Kim et al., 2004). For instane, Li and Engle nd that positive shoks depress futures
market for Treasury bond volatility while negative shoks inrease it. In ontrast, Chris-
tiansen nd no dierene between positive and negative announements shoks on interest
rate volatility. As for Clare and Johnson ()?, they nd that "good" news has a greater impat
on the deviation of short term interest rate than "bad" news. Existing studies suppose that
"bad" and "good" news have the same eet on seurities market during the whole period
retained. Contrary to these studies, this setion investigates whether positive and negative
news have the same eet on Government bond during "unstable" periods. The previous
setion showed that news announement days inuened mainly interest rate volatility only
during "unstable" periods without any signiant eet during "stable" periods. A seond
result was that interest rates level response to maroeonomi and monetary news does not
hange aross "stable" and "unstable" periods. Using these results, we test in this setion
whether positive and negative news announements have the same impat on interest rate
volatility during "unstable" periods.
6.1 Model
In order to hek whether positive and negative news announements aet dierently in-
terest rate volatility, we model the rst-dierened interest rate with an AR-EGARCH ap-
proah, proposed by Nelson (1991). The model an be desribed as follows:
∆Rt = a+ b∆Rt−1 + c∆r
∗
t +
K∑
k=1
dkD
a
k,t + ǫt. (5)
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In ontrast to the model desribed by the equations 3 and 4, in this model positive and
negative maroeonomi and monetary news (∆r∗+τ , D
a+
k,t , ∆r
∗−
τ and D
a−
k,t ) an aet interest
rate volatility dierently during "unstable" periods (DumR).
Assuming that ϕk,2 = γ2 = 0 gives the model desribed by equations 3 and 4.
6.2 Empirial results
We estimate interest rate dynamis with the model desribed by the equations 5 and 6. The
results are given in tables 5 and 6. In line with our previous results, U.S. interest rate level
responds mainly to the unantiipated part of the FED rate hanges and to the onsumer
prie index news (c and dCPI). Similarly, during "unstable" periods U.S. bond market
volatility is mainly aeted by FED deisions diusion days and by the announement days
of unemployment and gross domesti produt (γr∗ , γUE and γGDP ). Furthermore, negative
news announement days aet dierently interest rate volatility ompared to positive news
announement days. Negative news announements amplify interest rate volatility more
then positive news announements. For instane, the size of the negative (resp. positive)
unemployment news announement days on the 10 years bond rate volatility is 4.187 (resp.
2.504) (γUE,1 and γUE,2). This result is in aordane with our expetations and with the
results obtained by Morgan (1993), Thoma (1994), Karras (1996) and Kim et al. (2004).
Indeed, negative news means that agents have under-antiipated the maroeonomi release.
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For instane, a negative unemployment rate means that agents expetations are less that the
announed value.
[Insert Table 5 here℄
[Insert Table 6 here℄
Conlusion
In this paper, we investigate whether U.S. interest rate level and volatility reats dierently
to maroeonomi and monetary news during "stable" and "unstable" periods. For this, we
determine, rst, the "stable" and "unstable" periods by evaluating interest rate dynamis
with an ARCH markov swithing model proposed by Hamilton and Susmel (1994). In this
rst step, we nd that U.S. interest rate volatility was on the "high" state during periods
of nanial rises, the periods marked by eonomi and monetary instability as well as war
time periods. Then, we assume that interest rate level and volatility response to news during
"stable" periods and "unstable" periods may dier. In this seond step, we modelise interest
rate dynamis with an EGARH (1,1) model proposed by Nelson (1991). The results obtained
in this seond stage show that U.S nanial market volatility does not reat to maroeo-
nomi and monetary news announement days during "stable" periods. In ontrast, these
days inuene signiantly interest rate volatility during "unstable" periods. When we do
not make this distintion between "stable" and "unstable" periods and onsider a lassial
approah we see that U.S. interest rate volatility reats to announement days. Finally, we
hek whether "positive" and "negative" news aet dierently interest rate volatility. The
results obtained suggest that the eet of negative maroeonomi and monetary news an-
nounement days on the U.S. bond rate volatility is higher than positive news announement
days.
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Appendix
[Insert Table 7 here℄
[Insert Table 8 here℄
[Insert Table 9 here℄
[Insert Figure 5 here℄
[Insert Figure 6 here℄
[Insert Figure 7 here℄
[Insert Figure 8 here℄
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Table 1: Periods of "high" volatility
3-year bond 5-year bond 7-year bond 10-year bond
08/01/1990-31/08/1990 08/01/1990-11/09/1990 08/01/1990-26/03/1990 08/01/1990-17/05/1990
27/07/1990-03/09/1990 19/07/1990-21/01/1991
06/01/1992-07/04/1993 23/12/1991-08/04/1993 01/01/1992-25/03/1992 23/12/1991-27/03/1992
31/07/1992-26/11/1992 11/08/1992-23/11/1992
04/02/1993-05/04/1993 10/02/1993-07/04/1993
24/02/1994-23/09/1994 28/01/1994-23/09/1994 08/02/1994-01/09/1994 31/01/1994-14/09/1994
21/10/1994-05/09/1995 21/10/1994-20/09/1995 02/05/1995-15/08/1995 04/05/1995-17/08/1995
13/02/1996-24/09/1996 14/02/1996-14/10/1996 15/02/1996-15/08/1996 12/02/1996-20/09/1996
26/08/1998-20/08/1999 31/08/1998-12/10/1999 10/09/1998-12/10/1999 08/09/1998-12/10/1999
03/01/2000-08/06/2000 04/01/2000-02/06/2000 31/12/1999-09/06/2000
01/12/2000- 05/12/2000- 12/12/2000-18/05/2001 06/12/2000-25/05/2001
28/08/2001-20/03/2002 10/08/2001-22/03/2002
10/05/2002- 10/05/2002-
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Table 2: Results of the model benhmark
3-year bond 5-year bond 7-year bond 10-year bond
a 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
(−0,28) (−0,27) (−0,41) (−0,44)
b 0,057∗ 0,059∗ 0,063∗ 0,056∗
(3,50) (3,61) (3,76) (3,41)
c 0,244∗ 0,166∗ 0,117∗∗ 0,073
(3,64) (2,31) (1,73) (1,03)
dUE -0,120
∗
-0,100
∗∗
-0,082 -0,076
(−2,16) (−1,80) (−1,52) (−1,48)
dcpi 0,131
∗
0,132
∗
0,118
∗
0,104
∗
(2,91) (2,76) (2,49) (2,24)
dppi -0,021 -0,021 -0,020 -0,015
(−1,24) (−1,22) (−1,18) (−0,89)
dgdp 0,011 0,011 0,007 0,006
(0,95) (0,94) (0,67) (0,60)
dret 0,030
∗
0,025
∗∗
0,022 0,021
(2,04) (1,71) (1,56) (1,56)
dbp -0,002 -0,002 -0,001 -0,001
(−0,66) (−0,81) (−0,41) (−0,57)
w -5,437∗ -5,364∗ -5,107∗ -5,140∗
(−5,50) (−5,53) (−4,66) (−4,42)
θ 0,075 0,092∗∗ 0,109∗∗ 0,033
(1,32) (1,67) (1,83) (0,58)
α 0,009 0,022 0,040 0,059∗∗
(0,28) (0,75) (1,23) (1,87)
β 0,058 0,072 0,124 0,121
(0,34) (0,43) (0,65) (0,61)
γr∗ 0,703
∗
0,774
∗
0,733
∗
0,787
∗
(3,84) (3,67) (3,45) (3,22)
γUE 1,134
∗
1,124
∗
1,037
∗
0,994
∗
(8,89) (8,83) (8,33) (7,37)
γcpi 0,276
∗∗
0,258
∗
0,228
∗∗
0,251
∗
(1,91) (2,00) (1,89) (2,14)
γppi -0,038 -0,008 0,035 0,095
(−0,27) (−0,07) (0,25) (0,66)
γgdp 0,445
∗
0,466
∗
0,459
∗
0,437
∗
(3,90) (4,21) (4,08) (3,78)
γret 0,461
∗
0,463
∗
0,406
∗
0,297
∗
(3,14) (3,36) (2,89) (2,09)
γbp -0,187 -0,139 -0,135 -0,133
(−1,41) (−1,04) (−1,00) (−1,06)
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 %, respetively.
The numbers in (.) are the t-statistis.
∆Rt = a + b∆Rt−1 + c∆r
∗
t +
∑K
k=1 dkD
a
k,t + ǫt,
ln(ht) = w + α
ǫt−1√
h −1
+ βln(ht−1) + θ(|
ǫt−1√
h −1
| −
√
2/π) + γDumr∗τ
+
∑K
k=1 ϕkDum
a
k,t.
: FED rate; UE: unemployment; CPI: onsumer prie index; PPI: produer prie index;
GDP: gross domesti produt; BP: Balane of payment; RET: retail sales
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Table 3: Results of the model with "stable" and "unstable" periods distintion (mean)
3-year bond 5-year bond 7-year bond 10-year bond
a -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001
(−0,96) (−1,08) (−1,31) (−1,01)
b 0,062∗ 0,067∗ 0,075∗ 0,065∗
(3,92) (4,18) (4,63) (4,16)
stable periods
c 0,284∗ 0,246∗ 0,226∗ 0,234∗
(2,96) (2,65) (3,01) (3,41)
dUE -0,038 -0,041 -0,079 -0,035
(−0,54) (−0,56) (−1,21) (−0,56)
dcpi 0,160
∗
0,274
∗
0,185
∗
0,164
∗
(2,68) (4,49) (3,55) (2,71)
dppi 0,020 0,020 0,019 0,026
(1,09) (0,91) (0,90) (1,26)
dgdp -0,001 0,003 -0,006 -0,008
(−0,07) (0,27) (−0,58) (−0,75)
dret 0,009 0,004 0,031
∗∗
0,014
(0,54) (0,27) (1,91) (0,96)
dbp -0,004 -0,001 -0,001 0,001
(−1,23) (−0,24) (−0,19) (0,40)
unstable periods
c1 0,019 -0,081 -0,228 -0,261
∗∗
(0,13) (−0,48) (−1,21) (−1,68)
dUE,1 -0,119 -0,091 -0,029 -0,100
(−1,17) (−0,89) (−0,27) (−0,99)
dcpi,1 -0,029 -0,182
∗
-0,111 -0,105
(−0,34) (−2,09) (−1,21) (−1,19)
dppi,1 -0,091
∗
-0,079
∗
-0,083
∗
-0,075
∗
(−2,93) (−2,45) (−2,36) (−2,27)
dgdp,1 0,025 0,013 0,032 0,029
(1,23) (0,67) (1,57) (1,49)
dret,1 0,051 0,042 0,001 0,024
(1,93) (1,62) (0,03) (0,87)
dbp,1 0,003 -0,002 0,000 -0,003
(0,62) (−0,44) (−0,04) (−0,71)
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 %, respetively.
The numbers in (.) are the t-statistis.
∆Rt = a + b∆Rt−1 + c∆r
∗
t +
∑K
k=1 dkD
a
k,t + c1∆r
∗
t ∗ Dum
R +
∑K
k=1 dk,1D
a
k,t ∗Dum
R + ǫt
r∗: FED rate; UE: unemployment; CPI: onsumer prie index; PPI: produer prie index;
GDP: gross domesti produt; BP: balane of payment ; RET: retail sales
36
Table 4: Results of the model with "stable" and "unstable" periods distintion (volatility)
w -1,039∗ -1,234∗ -1,106∗ -1,211∗
(−4,20) (−5,53) (−6,25) (−5,97)
θ 0,047∗∗ 0,050∗∗ 0,009 0,003
(1,84) (1,85) (0,38) (0,13)
α -0,019 -0,035∗∗ -0,042∗ -0,048∗
(−0,97) (−1,73) (−2,26) (−2,51)
β 0,828∗ 0,794∗ 0,812∗ 0,796∗
(19,57) (20,71) (25,69) (22,27)
stable periods
γr∗ 0,234 -0,006 0,112 -0,039
(1,06) (−0,03) (0,58) (−0,17)
γUE 0,024 0,182 0,174 0,182
(0,12) (0,88) (1,08) (1,05)
γcpi -0,256 -0,168 -0,185 -0,173
(−1,31) (−0,78) (−1,12) (−0,93)
γppi -0,264 -0,210 -0,195 -0,207
(−1,29) (−0,95) (−1,09) (−1,12)
γgdp -0,056 -0,228 -0,203 -0,226
(−0,28) (−1,10) (−1,22) (−1,25)
γret -0,062 -0,167 -0,002 -0,056
(−0,27) (−0,71) (−0,01) (−0,31)
γbp -0,394
∗
-0,628
∗
-0,359
∗
-0,328
∗∗
(−2,27) (−2,89) (−2,20) (−1,88)
unstable periods
γr∗,1 0,216 0,611
∗∗
0,565
∗
0,660
∗
(0,75) (1,86) (2,07) (2,27)
γUE,1 0,743
∗
0,630
∗
0,654
∗
0,618
∗
(3,05) (2,60) (3,15) (2,80)
γcpi,1 0,403 0,300 0,343 0,393
∗∗
(1,61) (1,17) (1,54) (1,66)
γppi,1 0,121 -0,013 0,018 0,137
(0,42) (−0,05) (0,06) (0,49)
γgdp,1 0,765
∗
0,774
∗
0,862
∗
0,812
∗
(3,31) (3,53) (4,62) (4,17)
γret,1 0,318 0,509
∗∗
0,299 0,271
(1,03) (1,68) (1,00) (0,96)
γbp,1 0,422
∗∗
0,738
∗
0,489
∗
0,379
∗∗
(1,86) (2,94) (2,36) (1,74)
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 %, respetively.
The numbers in (.) are the t-statistis.
ln(ht) = w + α
ǫt−1√
ht−1
+ βln(ht−1) + θ(|
ǫt−1√
ht−1
| −
√
2/π) + γDumr∗τ
+
∑K
k=1 ϕkDum
a
k,t
+γ1Dumr∗τ
∗DumR +
∑K
k=1 ϕk,1Dum
a
k,t ∗Dum
R.
r∗: FED rate; UE: unemployment; CPI: onsumer prie index; PPI: produer prie index;
GDP: gross domesti produt; BP: Balane of payment; RET: retail sales
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Table 5: Results of the model with positive and negative news (Mean)
3-year bond 5-year bond 7-year bond 10-year bond
a -0,001 -0,001 -0,002∗ -0,001
(−1,54) (−0,68) (−1,96) (−1,52)
b 0,062∗ 0,064∗ 0,072∗ 0,064∗
(3,83) (3,88) (4,25) (4,01)
c 0,318∗ 0,227∗ 0,208∗ 0,162∗
(4,26) (3,10) (2,85) (2,41)
dUE -0,078 -0,030 -0,086 -0,068
(−1,53) (−0,55) (−1,61) (−1,37)
dcpi 0,156
∗
0,185
∗
0,144
∗
0,126
∗
(3,66) (4,32) (3,29) (2,83)
dPPI -0,013 -0,026 -0,016 -0,008
(−0,79) (−1,53) (−0,98) (−0,52)
dGDP 0,006 0,001 0,001 0,000
(0,62) (0,09) (0,11) (−0,05)
dRET 0,028
∗
0,018 0,026
∗
0,018
(2,05) (1,37) (1,94) (1,43)
dbp -0,002 -0,002 -0,001 -0,001
(−1,05) (−1,03) (−0,50) (−0,44)
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 %, respetively.
The number in (.) are the t-statistis.
∆Rt = a + b∆Rt−1 + c∆r
∗
t +
∑K
k=1 dkD
a
k,t + ǫt,
ln(ht) = w + α
ǫt−1√
ht−1
+ βln(ht−1) + θ(|
ǫt−1√
ht−1
| −
√
2/π)
+γ1Dum
+
r∗τ
∗DumR +
∑K
k=1 ϕk,1Dum
a+
k,t
∗DumR + γ2Dum
−
r∗τ
∗DumR +
∑K
k=1 ϕk,2Dum
a−
k,t
∗DumR.
r∗: entral bank rate , UE: unemployment; CPI: onsumer prie index; PPI: produer prie index;
GDP: gross domesti produt; BP: Balane of payment; RET: retail sales.
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Table 6: Results of the model with positive and negative news (Volatility)
3-year bond 5-year bond 7-year bond 10-year bond
w -0,452∗ -5,175∗ -0,516∗ -0,616∗
(−4,75) (−11,54) (−4,93) (−4,85)
θ 0,059∗ 0,075 0,050∗ 0,047∗
(3,22) (1,44) (2,55) (2,29)
α 0,004 0,027 0,015 0,024
(0,26) (0,94) (0,92) (1,40)
β 0,932∗ 0,096 0,919∗ 0,903∗
(60,27) (1,19) (52,69) (43,69)
γ
r∗,+
0,463 4,566
∗
1,734 1,889
(0,45) (3,27) (1,10) (1,33)
γ
r∗,−
-3,610
∗∗
-13,397
∗
-5,479
∗
-6,337
∗
(−1,92) (−5,04) (−2,57) (−2,82)
γ
UE+
2,071
∗
7,673
∗
2,436
∗
2,504
∗
(2,52) (6,45) (2,85) (2,42)
γ
UE−
-3,156
∗
-7,006
∗
-4,110
∗
-4,187
∗
(2,09) (4,78) (3,23) (3,37)
γ
CPI+
0,112 3,169
∗
0,357 0,943
(0,09) (2,04) (0,32) (0,87)
γ
CPI−
-0,501 -3,512
∗
-0,922 -1,768
∗∗
(−0,68) (−2,82) (−0,94) (−1,93)
γ
PPI+
0,530 -0,151 0,238 0,442
(1,51) (−0,21) (0,55) (1,06)
γ
PPI−
-0,371 -0,164 -0,354 -0,173
(−0,72) (−0,27) (−0,80) (−0,39)
γ
GDP+
1,438
∗
1,261
∗
1,082
∗
1,123
∗
(4,35) (3,62) (3,51) (3,80)
γ
GDP−
-0,626
∗
-1,170
∗
-0,570
∗
-0,555
∗
(−2,75) (−6,05) (−3,43) (−2,98)
γ
RET+
0,072 1,664
∗
0,363 0,060
(0,25) (2,77) (1,00) (0,19)
γ
RET−
-0,267 -0,007 -0,514 -0,465
(−0,60) (−0,01) (−1,23) (−1,13)
γ
BP+
-0,074 0,060 -0,096 -0,126
∗∗
(−1,19) (0,86) (−1,41) (−1,87)
γ
BP−
-0,019 0,054 -0,054 -0,041
(−0,32) (−0,56) (−0,86) (−0,67)
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 %, respetively.
The number in (.) are the t-statistis.
∆Rt = a + b∆Rt−1 + c∆r
∗
t +
∑K
k=1 dkD
a
k,t + ǫt,
ln(ht) = w + α
ǫt−1√
ht−1
+ βln(ht−1) + θ(|
ǫt−1√
ht−1
| −
√
2/π)
+γ1Dum
+
r∗τ
∗DumR +
∑K
k=1
ϕk,1Dum
a+
k,t
∗DumR + γ2Dum
−
r∗τ
∗DumR +
∑K
k=1
ϕk,2Dum
a−
k,t
∗DumR.
r∗: entral bank rate , UE: unemployment; CPI: onsumer prie index; PPI: produer prie index;
GDP: gross domesti produt; BP: Balane of payment; RET: retail sales.
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Table 7: Test of unit root
ADF Zivot and Andrews SEO
C B A C B A Model 2 Model 1 Model 0
ρ̂ β̂ ρ̂ µ̂ ρ̂
3-year bond -1.82 -1.17 -1.41 0.99 -1.52 -3.76 -2.26 -3.34 -1.52 -1.73 -2.18
[0.55℄ [0.54℄ [0.54℄
5-year bond -2.33 -1.79 -1.50 1.20 -1.33 -4.26 -2.55 -3.42 -2.08 -1.43 -1.86
[0.57℄ [0.57℄ [0.57℄
7-year bond -2.61 2.45 -1.57 1.32 -1.26 -4.65 -2.95 -3.48 -2.05 -1.36 -2.27
[0.59℄ [0.59℄ [0.59℄
10-year bond -2.97 -2.50 -1.61 1.40 -1.17 -4.80 -3.45 -3.52 -2.45 -1.14 -2.16
[0.61℄ [0.61℄ [0.56℄
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 % level, respetively.
The values [./.℄ in the entral part of the table orrespond to the month and the year of the hange.
The value [.℄ in the right hand of the table orresponds to the value of ρ.
4
2
F
i
g
u
r
e
5
:
3
-
y
e
a
r
b
o
n
d
r
a
t
e
v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1  0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
01/90
07/90
01/91
07/91
01/92
07/92
01/93
07/93
01/94
07/94
01/95
07/95
01/96
07/96
01/97
07/97
01/98
07/98
01/99
07/99
01/00
07/00
01/01
07/01
01/02
07/02
01/03
07/03
01/04
06/04
3-year rate
F
i
g
u
r
e
6
:
5
-
y
e
a
r
b
o
n
d
r
a
t
e
v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1  0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
01/90
07/90
01/91
07/91
01/92
07/92
01/93
07/93
01/94
07/94
01/95
07/95
01/96
07/96
01/97
07/97
01/98
07/98
01/99
07/99
01/00
07/00
01/01
07/01
01/02
07/02
01/03
07/03
01/04
06/04
5-year rate
4
3
Table 8: Statistial properties of the daily U.S. interest rate
3-year bond 5-year bond 7-year bond 10-year bond
Lyung-Box (LB)
test on the squared
residuals
LB(1) 3.592∗ 7.512∗ 18.264∗ 7.101∗
LB(5) 40.893∗ 48.647∗ 55.437∗ 47.970∗
LB(10) 63.716∗ 79.554∗ 92.816∗ 85.052∗
Box-Piere (BP)
test on the squared
residuals
BP (1) 3.591∗ 7.504∗ 18.244∗ 7.093∗
BP (5) 40.816∗ 48.558∗ 55.345∗ 47.884∗
BP (10) 63.572∗ 79.370∗ 92.611∗ 84.852∗
LM test for ARCH
eet (Engle
(1982))
LM − ARCH(1) 3.591∗ 7.505∗ 18.483∗ 7.094∗
LM − ARCH(5) 38.207∗ 44.478∗ 50.226∗ 43.474∗
LM − ARCH(10) 52.665∗ 63.356∗ 72.962∗ 65.301∗
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 % level, respetively.
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Table 9: Statistial properties of the innovations (ǫt) in the Eq. 3.
3-year bond 5-year bond 7-year bond 10-year bond
Ljung-Box des autoor-
rélations
0.006
∗
0.001
∗
0.002
∗
0.001
∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
8.043
∗
6.327 8.746
∗
9.655
∗
(0.05) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02)
14.701
∗∗
13.547
∗∗
14.720
∗∗
16.799
∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03)
LM pour l'eet ARCH
3.297
∗∗
12.704
∗
23.042
∗
9.109
∗
(0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
49.927
∗
56.993
∗
57.820
∗
50.075
∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
71.586
∗
77.162
∗
79.297
∗
72.141
∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 % level, respetively.
Figure 7: 7-year bond rate variation
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